Global Energy Imports to Peak by 2034
Rystad Energy’s fifth edition of the flagship Global Energy Scenarios GES 2026 report projects that global reliance on imported energy will peak by 2034, as security concerns accelerate electrification.
The projection follows two severe energy crises in five years: Russia’s war in Ukraine and the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, which disrupted flows through the Strait of Hormuz. Both shocks tested the system more intensely than the 1970s oil crises.
Europe’s LNG Pivot Reduces Russian Dependence
Resilience so far stems from capacity built after the first shock. In 2021, Russia supplied roughly 36% of Europe’s gas imports, while the United States accounted for about 6%. By 2025, Russian shipments fell to around 7.5% and U.S. LNG rose to roughly 21%.
That new LNG infrastructure now buffers the market, yet Europe and Asia compete for the same cargoes. The rivalry raises the risk that Europe could face winter stock shortfalls while Asian demand remains constrained.
On the oil side, pipelines, crude-on-water shipments, storage and demand-response measures have absorbed much of the shock, especially in China. Diesel strikes on Russian refineries coincided with reduced Hormuz flows, prompting Moscow to ban diesel exports.
Rising Diesel Prices Strain Global Freight
Diesel inventories sit about 14% below the five-year average, and U.S. diesel cracks have topped $100 per barrel, increasing costs for trucking, shipping and freight.
Policy response and electrification
Since February 2026, nearly 100 countries have cut fuel taxes, offered subsidies or capped prices to protect consumers. Sixty nations introduced demand-reduction measures, and 34 pursued structural changes.
Among the structural actions, 26 countries adopted electrification policies, with 22 located in Europe and Asia. The shift reflects growing political durability for electrification, even in nations such as Italy and Japan that previously emphasized sustainability less.
Most jurisdictions pair domestic renewables or nuclear with coal where reserves exist. While new coal plants are scarce, extensions, restarts and delayed phase-outs—Italy to 2038 and Thailand’s Mae Moh—add years of emissions.
New ‘Pragmatism’ Pathway Balances Policies
The report introduces a new reference pathway called “Pragmatism,” which assumes a gradual strengthening of existing policies. It sits between a “Climate first” scenario with rapid coordinated action and a “Fossil first” pathway with weaker policy support.
Under Pragmatism, primary energy demand reaches 702 exajoules by 2050—equivalent to adding another India to global demand in less than 25 years. Liquids demand declines about 2.2% per year to 102 million bpd in 2026, and gas demand falls roughly 0.9% per year to 4,150 billion cubic meters.
Oil and gas trade expands into the mid-2030s and stays above today’s level until 2043. Import dependence among net importers drops from around 40% now to 26% by 2050 in Pragmatism, versus 33% in Fossil first and 14% in Climate first.
Electricity overtook oil as the largest carrier of useful energy in 2025. Its share of total energy use is projected to rise from about 28% today to 41% by 2050 under Pragmatism, eventually surpassing coal, oil and gas combined.
Importers’ Energy Use Peaks, Gains Efficiency
Primary energy demand among importers peaks in 2038 at 421 exajoules, yet the amount of energy put to work grows 22% through 2050 because electric end-uses lose less energy than combustion.
Furthermore, Middle East exports are expected to hold near current levels through 2050, and Europe and Asia will still import around 76% and 49% of their gas, respectively. This highlights the ongoing dependence on imported energy, even as electrification accelerates.
In terms of investment, the Climate first scenario front-loads investment, at an average of $3.8 trillion per year from 2026 to 2050, compared with $2.9 trillion in Pragmatism and $2.3 trillion in Fossil first. For net importers, Climate first capex peaks at $3.1 trillion in 2037 and then falls to $1.1 trillion by 2050, below Fossil first. The cost gap narrows after 2040 as fuel bills fall and clean technologies scale.
Electricity is now linked to about 47% of global gross domestic product GDP, up from 38% in 2000, with China’s share up 28 percentage points to 48%. This shows the growing importance of electricity in the global economy.
Chinese battery electric vehicle exports are on track to reach 12% of global car sales outside China in 2026. Between January and July, exports to Europe reached nearly 1 million vehicles, about double the level of the same period in 2025, while exports to South America rose to around half a million from approximately 170,000. Battery storage is set to grow around 56% this year, ahead of solar at 18%, and electric trucks are on track to reach over 40% of heavy-truck sales in China, four years ahead of its 2030 target.
China holds 96% of solar wafer capacity, 95% of cathode materials, 91% of rare earth refining, 88% of solar cells and 78% of battery cells, and its smallest share among the segments shown, wind nacelles, is about two-thirds. This concentration of supply chain capacity in China has significant implications for the global energy sector.
Under the Pragmatism scenario, emissions fall to about 20 Gt by 2050. Cumulative emissions of 800 Gt from 2026 to 2050 correspond to around 0.35 degrees Celsius of additional warming, based on the IPCC estimate of about 0.1 degrees per 220 Gt of CO. In the Climate first scenario, emissions fall to about 2 Gt by 2050 and add around 0.25 degrees.
